Public Views of Azov and Radicalism in Ukraine

• In Event: Ukraine beyond the Battlefield: Domestic Politics and the Road to EU Accession

Abstract

Recent years have seen a rise not only in radical right parties, but also, in radical right uncivil society groups around the globe. This study compares the support base and attitudinal correlates of support among two manifestations of radical right ideology - one a party engaged in conventional politics, and one originated as a movement engaged in unconventional politics. Do they draw on the same supporters? This paper examines public support for far-right parties and Azov and addresses a ‘complementarity hypothesis’. It shows that there is a one-way (but not a two-way) linkage between supporters of militias / military unit and parties. Party networks draw supporters from militia fans, but militia sympathizers cannot be exclusively linked to radical right voters and supporters. Further, while prejudice determines support for militias, it does not influence support for radical right parties. The paper uses two original surveys in Ukraine. Both surveys used identical questions, when appropriate. They both included list experiments conducted, covering over 2000 respondents. One was conducted in 2016 and the second in December 2023. The data from the December survey are yet to be analysed.

More specifically, the paper examines linkages between supporters of radical right parties and supporters of armed voluntary movements associated with radical right ideology (Azov and Aidar battalions). Do parties and militias draw on the same supporters and, therefore, are they complementary? Is prejudice associated with social networks favourably inclined towards radical right parties or battalions? What is the role of the so called Euromaidan values in determining support for the far right and Azov? The paper uncovers a partial linkage between militias and parties: radical right parties can draw on supporters of the battalions. The linkage is, however, an incomplete one: militia supporters are not drawn from radical right voters and supporters, even if the public is, in general, sympathetic to them.

Three findings stand out. First, Azov regiment and Aidar battalion are viewed favourably by a large segment of the Ukrainian public. Yet, favourable assessments do not convert into support. The `true-level' of support for the two battalions uncovered by list experiments in 2016 was very small. Second, there is only a partial, fragile linkage between supporters of parties and supporters of militias. The Ukrainian far right - as a wide umbrella movement - is not a cohesive and unitary group. In overall, a strong linkage between sympathizers of militias and voters of radical right parties does not exist. Third, the paper finds that voters of mainstream parties view far right militias as favourably, or more, as some radical right voters. The survey in 2023 is aimed at isolating the role of security threats and probe into the durability of findings from 2016.

Author

• Lenka Bustikova, University of Florida