Wartime Violence and Attitudes toward the EU in Ukraine

• In Event: Ukraine beyond the Battlefield: Domestic Politics and the Road to EU Accession

Abstract

How does exposure to wartime violence affect citizens' orientations—do they become more parochial
or possibly more cosmopolitan? Specifically, what role do perceived external threats and personal
experiences of violence play in shifting support for joining organizations like the European Union
(EU), which requires a shift away from national identities? While political science theory suggests that
external threats and violence might lead to ethno-nationalist focus (Beber, Roessler, and Scacco 2014;
Berinsky 2009; Canetti et al. 2017; Canetti and Lindner 2014; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gagnon Jr 1994;
Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012; Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits 2020; Mansfield and Snyder 1995,
2002; Williams, Kestenbaum, and Meier 2020), existing literature indicates that conflict exposure
generally increases political engagement and altruism, albeit with a parochial nature (Voors et al. 2012;
Bauer et al. 2016; Villamil 2023).
Scholars have explored the origins and complexities of the EU as a peace project (Birchfield,
Krige, and Young 2017; Chaban, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin 2017; Manners and Murray 2016;
Visoka and Doyle 2016), with some examining the role of external threats in influencing a neighboring
country's accession (Chaisty and Whitefield 2017; Grabbe 2003; Onuch and Sasse 2022; Whitefield,
Rohrschneider, and Alisauskiene 2006). However, no single study has longitudinally traced the microlevel factors associated with EU accession over a decade, capturing the escalation of exogenous
threats. Our paper fills this gap, utilizing cross-sectional and panel data from 2012 to 2023 in the case
of Ukraine.
Amid Russia's invasion in 2023, our survey data reveals that 90% of Ukrainians support EU
accession, marking a significant change from a decade ago. In 2012, only a plurality supported it, with
variation across regions. The consensus grew following events like the Euromaidan mass mobilization
and the 2014 Russian invasion (Kulyk 2016, Mihaylov and Sala 2018, Stepanenko and Pylynskyi 2015,
Haran, Yakovlyev and Zolkina 2019). Examining ten years of survey data, we explore how economic
perceptions, identities, democratic values, and security perceptions shape Ukraine's European
consensus (Onuch 2023; Tucker, Pacek and Berinsky 2002). Contrary to common assumptions,
economic well-being matters less than factors like security perceptions, and the effects of drivers vary
over time.
Our key contribution is highlighting the consistent importance of a little-studied factor in EU
accession—perceptions of exogenous threats and exposure to conflict. In the context of Russian
aggression, conflict experience does not necessarily lead to ethnicization but rather fosters greater
support for integration into a multinational body. This result is driven by a shift in Ukrainian identity
towards an anti-Russian direction and a clarification of views on different states' roles in the
international order (Kulyk 2018, Zhuravlev and Ishchenko 2020)

Authors

• Olga Onuch, University of Manchester

• Grigore Pop-Eleches, Princeton University

• Graeme Robertson, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill