Property Rights, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict Resolution

• In Event: Justice and Injustice in War

Abstract

Why do some states resolve territorial conflicts peacefully while others do not? We explore this question by investigating the level of similarity between the two states' legal institutions, specifically property rights. We argue that the greater the level of similarity between two states' property rights, the more likely we may observe their nonviolent resolution of territorial conflict between them. To examine this argument, we use data covering all interstate territorial disputes, resolution types, and property rights institutions between claimant and defendant states from 1945–2015. This study has implications for the conflict management literature, suggesting that shared legal norms – beyond attributes like regime type and joint membership in IOs - may play an essential role in resolving disputes between states.

Authors

• Liana Eustacia Reyes, Dartmouth College

• Stephen C. Nemeth, Oklahoma State University