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One of the long-running debates in international relations questions the motivations for the governments to wage war and for the political opposition to oppose the decision to use force. The governments are incentivized to wage war to consolidate their power at home by triggering the rally-around-the-flag effect. On the other hand, the opposition may oppose such decisions precisely because it may consolidate the power of the government, which may tilt the domestic political field at the expense of the opposition. After all, the governments need victories, and the people need defeats, as Solzhenitsyn reminds us. Nevertheless, it is also true that the decisions of the use of force may indeed serve the national interests and may arise out of the necessities of international politics. Thus, another strand of literature focuses on the prospects of victory as the main criteria for the opposition to support or oppose a war decision. Simply put, one theory expects the opposition to support a war decision on national grounds because the government could be successful. In contrast, another one expects the opposition to oppose on political grounds precisely because the government may be successful. This study tests the scope conditions of both theories and argues that the level of affective polarization mediates the direction of the support for the use of force. It argues that polarized groups are more likely to evaluate a war decision based on its repercussions at home and oppose a war if it could be won, whereas non-polarized groups are more likely to evaluate a war based on prospects of victory. The paper will present the results of a survey experiment conducted in December 2023, testing these hypotheses.