Emergency Powers: Delegation under Electoral Uncertainty

• In Event: Models of Collective Decision-Making

Abstract

This paper develops a model of congressional delegation to the president where delegation is contingent on a partisan majority’s reelection prospects as well as partisan control of the executive and legislative branches. Under unified control a partisan congressional majority with a same party president may achieve policy outcomes at its policy goals. Under divided control, a partisan congressional majority with an opposite party president will increase delegation as uncertainty increases or polarization decreases. However, status quo policy and delegation are sometimes subject to gridlock, and a congressional majority is often unable to achieve its ideal point through new legislation governing delegation. We derive conditions under which congressional majorities over- and under-delegate authority to the executive. Though under-delegation is addressed through new legislation, congressional majorities with opposite party presidents often cannot limit discretionary authority once it is granted.

Authors

• Lauren Futter, Columbia University

• David Simpson

• Michael M. Ting, Columbia University