Strategies of Military Capability Revelation: How States Signal Military Power

• In Event: Military Power and Strategy

Abstract

How do states reveal information about advanced nuclear and conventional military technologies in the context of peacetime security competition? Whereas existing research on security competition and signaling overwhelmingly focuses on how states assess foreign military threats and signal resolve, this paper instead evaluates how states variously hide, misrepresent, or disclose information about advanced military technologies for strategic advantage. I argue that five capability revelation strategies are available to states: hiding, in which the state conceals information about capabilities; obscuring, in which the state reveals limited information to cloak capabilities in uncertainty; alarming, in which the state exaggerates relative capability weaknesses; swaggering, in which the state exaggerates relative capability strengths; and disclosing, in which the state reveals transparent information about capabilities. I propose an original theory that explains why states select one capability revelation strategy over others. Specifically, I argue that the choice of revelation strategy operates as a function of three variables: first, the degree to which a state fears that revelation will risk the signaled capability; second, the appraised likelihood of war; and third, a state’s level of competitive confidence toward a technology (whether it views a capability as a source of competitive advantage over its rival). I test my theory through archival research, process tracing, and two case studies of capability revelation: Britain’s revelation of advanced naval technologies during the Anglo-German Naval Race before the First World War and America’s revelation of strategic stealth aircraft during the Cold War.

Author

• Nicholas Blanchette, Massachusetts Institute of Technology