Complementary Appointments

• In Event: Presidential Appointments

Abstract

This project evaluates the compounding returns to successful presidential appointments. At the federal level, the lion's share of executive interaction with the judiciary occurs in district courts. Judges--chosen by the president and his predecessors--interact with U.S. Attorneys--also presidential appointees. So, what are the consequences of presidents staffing both the bench and the bar? By combining data on the docket, case outcomes, U.S. Attorneys, and judges, we identify a complementary effect of judicial and executive appointments. As America's courtrooms become increasingly populated by the current president's appointees, more cases consistent with the president's policy agenda are filed and the government's success rate climbs even higher. Observation at the district level reveals that these patterns are conditioned by the size of the district, judicial vacancies, and the likelihood of appellate review. To explain these regularities, we draw insight from theoretical work on the strategic interaction of bureaucrats and courts, as well as empirical studies of executive and judicial decision-making.

Author

• Lauren Mattioli, Boston University