How the Language of Civil War “Works” in the Russo-Ukraine Conflict

• In Event: The Influence of Global Dynamics on Local Wars

Abstract

Naming the Russo-Ukraine War has been controversial since 2014. Russian diplomats deployed the term “civil war” as a preferred descriptor until 2022. Following Hansen (2006), we employ discourse analysis of the 2014-2022 period, examining how practices of naming, in English-language securitized discourses, served either Russian or Ukrainian policy aims. Our point of entry is the controversies surrounding the civil war classification. “Civil” war implies military non-involvement on the part of the Russian military and puts causal weight on Ukrainian domestic variables (e.g., a “fascist coup,” well-rehearsed east-west cleavages in the pre-2014 Ukrainian state, reproducing stereotypes of Ukraine as corrupt, “a weak state,” non-democratic, etc.). This narrative track conveniently accesses legal precedents (R2P, Kosovo) authorizing Russia’s use of force. Since favored internationalist mechanisms developed for settling civil wars privilege the United Nations Security Council, the OSCE, and other consensus forums, many liberal talking points functionally redirected energy to forums where Russians enjoy a veto – and de-linked Crimea (“peaceful self-determination”) from the war in the Donbas (“violent and tragic, requiring costly/sustained collective action…”). We conclude noting that forward-looking investments in collective security demand new narratives, so Western academics will continue to have a special responsibility in de-amplifying Kremlin disinformation.

Authors

• Dominique Arel, University of Ottawa

• Jesse Driscoll, University of California, San Diego