Aid, Alliances, and Policy Concessions

• In Event: Alliance Dynamics and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Foreign aid and diplomatic visits are among the most notable foreign policy tools that states use to extract policy concessions from other states. Research on diplomatic visits and aid-for-policy deal neglects the conditions under which combinations of foreign policy tools add, complement, or substitute one another. We argue that the effectiveness of visits and aid depends on the size of policy concession and nature of relationship with the recipient country. Non allies have more incentive to reciprocate transactions with policy concessions to signal convergence of foreign policy and protect future transactions and commitments from donor state. On the contrary, formal allies are not obligated to reciprocate with policy concessions due to the commitment of the alliance. For less costly concessions, non-allies value material goods while allies value the information role of the visit to reduce uncertainty. For costly concessions, material benefits are more valuable, particularly in the absence of an alliance. Using data on US diplomatic visits, foreign economic and military aid, and formal alliances from 1982 to 2017, we find empirical support for our theoretical predictions. Visits, aid, and alliances complement each other’s effect for less costly concessions such as UNGA voting, while they substitute one another for more costly concessions such as participation in US military interventions.

Authors

• HASHIM MALALLAH, Florida State University

• Brian Blankenship, University of Miami