The Restrictive Special Rule Revolution in the U.S. House of Representatives

• In Event: Party Politics in the U.S. Congress

Abstract

In recent decades, the House Committee on Rules has assigned more restrictive special rules to bills than it has in congressional history. Restrictive special rules are comprised of structured and closed rules that often limit the scope and number of amendments for House bills while also limiting the amount of debate that can take place about a bill prior to floor votes. In 1993, just nine percent of the total number of special rules assigned to bills in the House were closed rules. By 2021, nearly 54% of the total number of special rules assigned to bills were closed rules, a 45% increase. Although there has been a substantial rise in the use of restrictive special rules, few studies examine the types of bills that are being assigned these rules and what (if any) features about these bills make them particularly suitable for special rule assignments. Furthermore, few studies assess why the trending use of restrictive special rules is significant and what implications this has for an open, accessible, and deliberative law-making environment in Congress. Using original data collected on House bills receiving special rules in the 107th (2001-2003), 110th-116th (2007-2021) Congresses and data from the Center for Effective Lawmaking that classifies bill sponsors’ legislative effectiveness scores, this paper identifies distinct variables contributing to the rise in restrictive special rules. The key variables identified in this research—out-party bill co-sponsorships and majority party status—provide a window into the current state of partisan lawmaking and they suggest that sustained polarization in the contemporary Congress is a likely culprit that has limited members’ opportunities to collaborate on the types of bills that are assigned restrictive special rules. With members of the majority party holding fast to restrictive special rules to shield the priority bills that they have on their legislative agenda, evidence of protectionist procedural politics persists and offers new opportunities to examine how members cope with enduring partisanship in the modern congressional arena.

Author

• Breanna Crystene Gray, University of Maryland, College Park