Public Support in Challenging Times: Varieties of Crises and Executive Approval

• In Event: Climate Crises, Violence and Governance

Abstract

A vast body of research on executive approval has produced a shared understanding of the drivers and cyclical dynamics of presidential and prime ministerial approval in normal times. In recent years, however, times have rarely been normal. We know little about how approval moves under extraordinary circumstances and even less about similarities and differences across crisis events. Existing work does not capture the complexity of the public response to leader performance under the stress of crises like the recent COVID-19 pandemic, or in the context of prolonged conflicts like the invasion of Ukraine, or in places beset by environmental disasters or economic crises. And yet, during crises like these public support often supplies leaders with policy latitude, allowing them more freedom to act and empowering them to respond to the emergency. Crises can generate approval rallies that leaders can leverage to enact policy, but they can also sink leaders’ approval and weaken their political standing.

In this paper we explore the drivers of executive approval during crises in four policy domains: the economy, security, the environment, and public health. To do this, we pull insights from disparate literatures into a single, coherent theoretical framework. We make two key arguments. First, popular reactions to crises develop in two stages, each marked by distinct political processes. In the first affective phase, informational asymmetries allow the executive to dominate the agenda and foster predominantly positive emotional reactions—and an approval rally—from the public. In a second evaluative phase, the flow of information allows the public to form judgements regarding leader performance and to attribute responsibility for the emergency. Second, the impact of crises on support for executives is shaped by variation in the features of crises, in the information environment, and in the political context. As we develop in the paper, we expect the public to rally behind the leader when the crisis domain provides the executive a disproportionate informational advantage relative to other political actors. This can happen when the executive has privileged access to information, as in international security or when disasters are unexpected, like a rare or unusually severe tornado. By contrast, rallies should be less likely after repeated crises. Where a certain type of crisis is common—e.g., in areas besets by frequent hurricanes or places where a certain disease is endemic—the costs to citizens of acquiring information should dimmish and expectations for government preparedness and action should increase.

To test our arguments, we pair quarterly time series data on executive approval from over fifty countries across 25 years with an original dataset that brings together measures on the occurrence, severity, and spillover potential of economic, security, natural and health crisis events.

Authors

• Ryan Carlin, Georgia State University

• Timothy Hellwig, University at Buffalo SUNY

• Gregory Love, University of Mississippi

• Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

• Matthew Singer, University of Connecticut

• Will Horne, Clemson University

• Jonathan Hartlyn, Univ North Carolina, Chapel Hill