Subnational Political Budget Cycles in Mexico

• In Event: Multilevel Governance and the Subnational Turn in Latin America

Abstract

Research shows that national democracies as well as national autocracies run opportunistic political budget cycles, raising national fiscal spending just ahead of elections. Research also shows that subnational governments in decentralized, nationally democratic systems do the same. However, less is known about whether subnational democratic enclaves in decentralized national autocracies and subnational authoritarian enclaves in decentralized national democracies run political budget cycles as well. Building on research in comparative politics showing the importance of subnational fiscal spending in raising the chances of subnational incumbent parties at the polls, this study examines how shifts in municipal- and state-level political competition in Mexico interacts to affect trends and timing municipal fiscal spending. Municipal incumbents facing greater political competition during state and/or national authoritarian rule raise spending at greater rates ahead of elections than those whose parties are more firmly in place. Time-series cross-sectional analysis of the impact of shifts in local political competition on municipal and state fiscal spending across Mexico’s nearly 2,500 municipalities and 32 states between 1990-2022 demonstrates this relationship.

Author

• Allyson L. Benton, University of Essex