Tacit Dissent to Immigration Law: The Case of Short-Term Migration

• In Event: State Duties and Migrant Obligations: Who Owes What?

Abstract

Resistance to immigration law and the question of political obligation have recently attracted normative theorists. Scholars have examined whether non-citizens have a duty to obey the immigration law or right to resist unjust immigration law, emphasizing the justification of civil disobedience, dissent, and resistance. In this paper, I investigate whether, and to what extent, short-term migrants and travelers can resist immigration law and policies that govern their duration of stay or extensions, and lawful paths to reside. Following the scholarship on political obligation and dissent, I demonstrate that violation of immigration law can be a form of tacit dissent, and I argue that short-term migrants are morally permitted to overstay if the immigration policies are not justified.

This paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, drawing from the political obligation literature, I examine whether non-citizens have a duty to obey immigration law. Secondly, as an alternative to membership and consent account of political obligation, I conceptualize “tacit dissent” and give examples of tacit dissent in the immigration context. I am particularly interested in shortterm migrants, travelers, and the immigration law that govern their duration of stay or extensions, and lawful paths to reside. Finally, I examine whether, and under what circumstances, it is morally permissible for short-term migrants to tacitly dissent immigration law.

Keywords: political obligation, consent, tacit dissent, short-term migration, immigration law

Author

• Ugur Altundal, Dartmouth College