Activating Anger and Popular Support for Democratic Backsliding

• In Event: Populism, Polity, and Economy

Abstract

Populist leaders have successfully been able to undermine democratic norms in several countries around the world. Previous work has highlighted a strong relationship between populism, democratic backsliding, and the erosion of horizontal democratic accountability. Perhaps counterintuitively, populist leaders commonly maintain high levels of popular support even while they actively dismantle democratic institutions. Leaders like Orban in Hungary, Chavez in Venezuela, Duterte in the Philippines, or Lopez Obrador in Mexico offer stark examples of this trend. This phenomenon raises a critical question: why do citizens tolerate, or even endorse, leaders who actively weaken democratic institutions? How can populist leaders maintain their popularity while dismantling democratic institutions? Why do citizens support politicians and actions that undermine democratic institutions?
We offer a novel theoretical mechanism to explain the puzzling combination of populist success, democratic erosion, and continued popular support. We argue that populist leaders leverage the use of dispositional frames to increase support for measures that erode democracy. A key characteristic of populist rhetoric is the use of dispositional frames. These frames attribute ongoing societal grievances, such as poverty, corruption, or democratic failure, to the intentional wrongdoing of establishment parties and politicians (the former “corrupt elite”). By portraying grievances as the deliberate machinations of rival elites, populist leaders can activate both anger and negative political evaluations towards them. In turn, heightened anger and negative evaluations directed against establishment elites increase citizens’ tolerance to measures that erode democracy, particularly when those actions are framed as a way of curtailing the power of those who are blamed for the grievances. This dynamic helps explain how populists can dismantle democratic checks and balances while maintaining public support.
We empirically test this argument using two preregistered survey experiments. We study the case of Mexico’s democratic erosion during the Lopez Obrador administration. In the first survey experiment, we evaluate whether employing dispositional frames, in opposition to situational frames attributing grievances to external factors, fuels negative evaluations and anger directed toward the former corrupt elite (the “PRIAN”in the case of Mexico). This provides evidence of the first step of our theory: situational frames increase anger and negative affects directed towards political elites.
In the second experiment, we evaluate whether framing measures against democratic institutions as ways to punish the political elite enhance their tolerance towards these actions. Acting against the political elites increases support for actions that undermine democratic rules and institutions. Notably, results from a mediation analysis show reveal that actions framed against the political elite are particularly popular among those with high levels of anger and negative evaluations towards the former “corrupt elite”.

Authors

• Nicolás de la Cerda, Tulane University

• Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, University of Massachusetts, Lowell