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Blacklisted Rebels: Commitment to Child Rights in Armed Conflict in Nepal

Thu, September 5, 10:00 to 11:30am, Pennsylvania Convention Center (PCC), 113B

Abstract

Why do some rebel groups comply with international laws prohibiting child rights violations, whereas other rebel groups continue to violate child rights by killing, maiming, recruiting, using, abducting, and sexually abusing children? This paper examines the mechanisms through which a rebel group commits to and complies with UN action plans for children from the case of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (UCPN-M). The UN had blacklisted UCPN-M for the recruitment and use of children in its Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict since 2002. In 2009, UCPN-M signed an action plan for the discharge and rehabilitation of the disqualified Maoist army personnel verified as minors. In 2011, it was eventually delisted from the Secretary-General’s annual report after discharging 2,394 children. It is notable that UCPN-M, a rebel group ineligible to be a member of any UN human rights treaties, would voluntarily sign and comply with a written agreement with the UN to end its child rights violations.

By examining UN official reports and conducting online interviews, I investigate how UCPN-M’s consideration of domestic and international legitimacy led it to sign and comply with its UN action plan to end child soldiering. I argue that, first, a rebel group tends to sign a UN action plan when it is secessionist because international and domestic legitimacy is crucial for such a group that seeks recognition of its independent status. Second, the low likelihood of future conflicts, evident in the group’s signing of a peace agreement, is necessary for rebel groups’ compliance with UN action plans. However, rather than simply signing a peace agreement, implementing power-sharing provisions is the most crucial factor that lowers a rebel group’s perceived likelihood of future conflicts, leading to its compliance with a UN action plan. In other words, a rebel group tends to comply with a UN action plan when it implements the power-sharing provisions of its peace agreement with the government. Specifically, the Nepali case shows that UCPN-M’s social services, including education, enabled it to recruit children efficiently. However, the group signed and complied with its UN action plan only after it successfully implemented some power-sharing provisions of the peace agreement with the government, including formal participation in national elections. My process-tracing analysis also demonstrates that UCPN-M complied with its UN action plans while implementing their respective peace agreements in order to be considered legitimate political actors by international actors, especially those who are involved in peace processes.

This research project is significant for two reasons. First, this project contributes to the literature on both international institutions and conflict studies by leveraging theories in these fields and explaining non-state actors’ commitment to international law. Most researchers consider a rebel group’s non-use of child soldiers indicates its active commitment to international humanitarian law for children. However, such a presupposition overlooks some groups who may not use child soldiers because they have no incentive to use children or have viable alternatives. By focusing on rebel groups that have already violated child rights and been blacklisted by the UN, my project shows when and why the UN’s “naming and shaming” increases such groups’ commitment to international humanitarian law. Second, this project also contributes to the literature by providing new empirical evidence on non-state armed groups’ behavior regarding the abuse of children in armed conflict. With the multi-method approach with original quantitative and qualitative data, I utilize various methodological tools to explain the entire process of violating child rights, listing violators, signing action plans, and complying with the action plans. In particular, my case study from Nepal is important as there has been no significant empirical research on the UCPN-M’s compliance with its UN action plan for children, despite the fact that UCPN-M is one of three successful cases of compliance. Through field research in Nepal, I provide original qualitative data to analyze various actors’ motivations and behaviors behind UCPN-M’s compliance process.

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