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Do foreign aid donor governments collaborate by carving out spheres of influence in the pursuit of private foreign policy objectives while simultaneously minimizing free-riding in support of public goods? This study seeks to answer this question by leveraging a concept called lead donorship and novel measures that help to triangulate foreign aid's private and public goods benefits. The findings, based on a semi-parametric modeling approach, reveal a systematic absence of donor cooperation in foreign aid allocation, which is a product both of competition for top donor status in some recipients and buck-passing in other recipients. These results contribute to the understanding of cooperation failure in aid allocation and its policy implications.