The Power of Tacit Knowledge in Intervention Decision-Making

• In Event: Interventions and Conflict Resolution

Abstract

This paper explores the political decision-making processes that lead countries and international organizations such as the UN, NATO, the EU, or the AU to launch military interventions. Three key explanations have been advanced thus far to explain agency in intervention decisions: (1) a “unitary actor model” suggesting that the head of state and his/her closest advisers politically plan and orchestrate when and how to intervene abroad; (2) a “bureaucratic politics model” proposing that intervention decisions result from bargaining and compromises among a range of political “players” and (3) a “mass mobilization model,” which argues that a domestic groundswell can lead to military interventions. I find each of these theories wanting and propose a theory that argues that intervention entrepreneurs are the key drivers behind intervention decisions. The rationales for why these actors turn into intervention entrepreneurs vary widely. Nevertheless, each one stands to gain a greater normative, political, economic, or financial utility from a specific intervention than does the average citizen. Why are they successful? Launching a military intervention is a complex political process steeped in uncertainty. A large variety of actors and policy fields are involved with unpredictable interaction effects. Intervention entrepreneurs possess the tacit knowledge to manage this complexity. Most of the time this tacit knowledge is gained in previous government experience. I test this theory using a dataset of all US-led miliary interventions and corroborate causal mechanism via historical case study research.

Author

• Marina Elisabeth Henke, Hertie School