Everywhere and Nowhere: Israel’s Dilemma in Gaza’s Underground Warfare

• In Event: Poster Session: Frontiers in Conflict Processes

Abstract

Actors with limited military capabilities resort to Tunnel Warfare for four main reasons. First, it serves as a counterbalance against the overwhelming military and technological superiority of the larger army, significantly enhancing the prospects of safeguarding fighters from surface attacks, such as artillery shelling and aerial assaults. Second, the presence of tunnels obstructs the progress of infantry forces, compelling them to proceed with caution and within imposed limitations. Third, tunnels offer a range of tactical advantages, including the facilitation of surprise attacks, effective counter-siege measures, unhindered movement for actors with limited military capabilities, secure withdrawal from battlegrounds, the execution of attacks and infiltration operations behind enemy lines, and a formidable challenge to the principle of early warning that is launched when deterrence measures prove insufficient in preventing potential threats, disrupting the conventional sequence of military response. Fourth, tunnels provide protection for armaments and supply installations, serving as operational spaces for military command and control centers, and restrict the adversary’s ability to gather intelligence about the weaponry and military capabilities concealed underground.
The strategic deployment of tunnels in warfare is not a new tactic. The Assyrians, Greeks, and Romans all dug tunnels to infiltrate besieged cities. In more recent history, tunnel warfare emerged as a pivotal combat strategy during the American Civil War (1861-1865) and trench battles of the First World War (1914-1918), particularly notable on the French front. The art of tunneling continued to evolve, finding prominence in the tactics of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam (Viet Cong) during the Vietnam War (1955-1975). More contemporarily, Ukrainians exhibited a resilient employment of tunnels in their resistance against Russian forces in Azovstal and Mariupol in 2022.
Viewed within this historical continuum, the Palestinian militant forces in Gaza have effectively used tunnels as an operational tool in wars, overcoming the challenges posed by Gaza’s small geography, the enduring blockade, and the lack of an air force on one hand, and the Israeli army’s military, intelligence, and surveillance superiority on the other. The Palestinian forces have moved the battle to areas where they have a performance superiority. This has compelled the Israeli army to change its strategic approach into engaging in ground warfare instead of relying solely on airstrikes, a tactic which has been favored since the 1982 Beirut war. This shift aims at mitigating risks faced by its soldiers operating beyond its borders.
Therefore, tunnels have become a primary target in Israeli wars on the Gaza Strip since the 2014 war. However, tunnels remain resistant to detection and complete destruction despite that Israel had conducted seven military operations over the past nine years. This raises doubts about Israel’s ability to destroy the Palestinian militant forces’ infrastructure. The covert nature of tunnels makes military planning challenging, as it is difficult to determine the exact area from which the threat emanates, or to define the intended target or the time required to destroy it. This informational gap renders the destruction of tunnels an unreasonable objective unless Israel eliminates any threat emerging from both above and beneath the ground.
This paper explores the underground warfare in the Gaza Strip between Palestinian militant forces and the Israeli army. The paper provides a historical panorama of tunnels in the Gaza Strip, their evolution, types, and effectiveness. It then presents the Israeli military strategy towards these tunnels, the techniques used to identify, destroy, or neutralize them, and the limitations of these techniques. To underpin this analysis, the paper adopts the conceptual frameworks of subterranean warfare and asymmetric warfare, leveraging open-source intelligence.

Author

• Majd Abuamer, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies