Putin's Repressive Law Machine: How Russia Suppresses Anti-war Expression

• In Event: Protest, Repression and Violence

Abstract

Research on law in authoritarian countries has revealed that authoritarian leaders are masters at creatively and pragmatically using law and courts to achieve their political goals. Putin’s Russia is a stark example. Since 2012, the Russian state has increasingly relied on the law as a tool of repressive governance, using it to consolidate its power, dissuade opposition, and punish its enemies. Using low-intensity repression through administrative offenses (non-criminal, fineable violations) combined with high-level repression through high-profile criminal prosecutions, the Russian state has developed a powerful strategy for suppressing dissent—one that democracies experiencing retrenchment might effectively learn from. This form of repressive law is not only about targeting and punishing outspoken political and societal opposition figures, which has been the focus of much of the literature, but also extends to ordinary people targeted for ordinary activities. While many of these techniques have been developed over the past decade, Russia’s use of legalized repression has found its apotheosis in suppression of wartime dissent after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 when laws were passed outlawing “discrediting” and disseminating “knowingly false information” about the Russian military.

In this project, we explore the implementation of “discrediting the military” and “knowingly false information” laws in Russia with a focus on actor incentives and the discretionary environment. To do so, we combine insights from a large corpus of judicial documents--approximately 10,000 first-instance and appellate “discrediting” rulings along with over 400 criminal cases concerning “knowingly false information”--with a multi-pronged methodological approach. Employing tools for natural language processing (NLP) and quantitative analysis, we chart and analyze overarching patterns in case outcomes and legal interpretations. Complementing this, we use deep qualitative analysis to dissect the nuances of the legal arguments and outcomes, illuminating the “ground-level” realities of implementing these laws. Our analysis centers on legal bureaucrats--the police, investigators, prosecutors, and judges who translate this complex legal situation into everyday practice. We unpack their evolving understanding and application of ambiguous statutes, exploring how incentive structures and discretion shape their behavior. In doing so, we demonstrate how legal uncertainty transforms into settled practice over time.

In addition to the empirical contribution of tracking these repressive laws as they unfold in real time in a context in which on-the-ground research has become impossible, we also contribute to broader discussions about the importance of law and courts as a mechanism for enabling authoritarian consolidation and by extension democratic erosion. The assumption in much of the literature is that repressive law is exclusively a top-down phenomenon. In moving to a bottom-up perspective that takes the incentives of legal actors seriously, we show that, as in all systems, it is ordinary people responding to bureaucratic incentives who are tasked with implementing laws and making decisions. Despite its repressive turn, the Russian state appears to remain interested in the societal legitimacy that comes with the use of law as a set of procedures that mimic fairness. Like other more modern “spin” dictatorships, Russia does not engage in significant extrajudicial activity to punish dissent, choosing instead to rely primarily on the legal system to repress. Yet, our research demonstrates how even a well-designed system can be turned towards repression if laws are vague and bureaucratic incentives are oriented towards conviction. Repressive law is at its most effective when it creates an uncertain legal regime for citizens and at the same time allows for a veneer of legitimacy in its procedures and practices.

Note: We are interested in the longer time slot option because this paper is a chapter of a book project which will be nearing completion of a draft around the time of APSA. We would benefit immensely from the careful reading of one dedicated commentator.

Authors

• Lauren McCarthy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

• Doug Rice, University of Massachusetts