Purges and Reputation

• In Event: Formal Models of Autocratic Politics

Abstract

Why do dictators publicize failed conspiracies against themselves? I develop a formal model of reputation to show that purging alleged conspirators serves two purposes: prevention and deterrence. Dictators not only aim to arrest potentially lurking conspiracies, but also to make potential future conspirators believe a dictator features too dense a network of loyal informants to be overthrown. Dictators who lack such networks can still cultivate a reputation for invincibility endogenously when accusing others arbitrarily. I also discuss the effects of both institutionalization and a dictator’s recruitment of kin, coethnics, and other identity groups into political positions. These insights help us better understand why and when dictators publicly acknowledge firm opposition, fill ranks with members from their own identity groups, and avoid institutionalization.

Author

• Felix Dwinger, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse 1