Patrimonialism as Insurance: Landholding and Competitive Politics in Chile

• In Event: Historical Approaches to Comparative Politics

Abstract

Current research suggests that landed elites reject democratization since enfranchisement increases the likelihood of expropriation of fixed assets, such as land. Contrary to this dominant approach, this paper suggests that landowners may prefer democracy if they share strong clientelistic bonds with a large pool of peasants they can use as a bastion of electoral support. I build and illustrate the theory studying Chile. Using untapped evidence from censuses, national budgets, statistical yearbooks, and business organizations records, I show that landed elites boosted their influence in the national political arena thanks to their patrimonial control over land and peasants. After losing control over the ruling coalition in 1873, landowners created a long-term electoral advantage by enfranchising peasants within Chile’s Central Valley. Together with enfranchisement, landed elites succeeded in creating favorable electoral institutions and diminishing the regulatory capacity of the local bureaucracy to maintain control over the peasantry.

Author

• Maximiliano Vejares, Tec de Monterrey