Behavioral Justifications for "Structure" Induced Equilibria

• In Event: Models of Collective Decision-Making

Abstract

Patty and Penn (2014 CUP) and others have developed social choice theoretic models that connect individuals' choices with those individuals' legitimation principles. That is, choices and justifications (or rationalizations) are melded in those models. We argue that the U.S. Congress is an ideal setting to explore the force of such models because legislators so often justify their choices via blame avoidance and vote explanation. A foundation of blame avoidance is consistent with some of the most prominent literature on legislators’ behaviors and with models of choice in behavioral economics. We characterize the equilibria that occur when legislators use blame avoidance and vote explanation as justifications. Those equilibria are then contrasted with the standard structure induced equilibria (SIE). Blame avoidance and vote explanation yield stable social choice outcomes in a legislative body similar to structure-based models.

Author

• Scott H. Ainsworth, University of Georgia