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The conventional wisdom in the study of international statebuilding holds that such interventions trigger a backlash among the population in the host state that causes statebuilding efforts to fail. While scholars differ on the nature of the backlash, with some attributing it to nationalism and others focusing on the misalignment of policy preferences between statebuilders, domestic leaders, and the local population, they share the view that the backlash is inescapable. We argue that this is not always the case. When the political preferences of the statebuilder and the incumbent government diverge less than the preferences of the government and a credible domestic political opposition, the statebuilder can avoid triggering a backlash that undermines statebuilding efforts. We examine this proposition in the context of the U.S. occupation of Japan (1945-1952) through an analysis of legislative speeches in the Japanese Diet. Our study contributes to the scholarship on international intervention and international statebuilding by highlighting how domestic political competition in the host state can facilitate rather than impede statebuilding.