Maybe Later: Term Limits and Strategy behind Candidate Entry

• In Event: Beyond the Traditional in Patterns of Political Participation

Abstract

Many reformers view term limits as a way to force out long-term incumbents and bring new faces to state legislatures. I argue they have had the opposite effect because they reduce the number of candidates who challenge incumbents. By increasing the frequency of open races, term limits incentivize potential challengers to wait for an open race, leading to incumbent lock-in. To demonstrate this, I analyze primary data from 85 legislative chambers in 44 states over a two-decade period to see how term limits alter challenger entry patterns. I show that term-limited incumbents face fewer challengers in their last two terms in office and are less likely to face primary challengers earlier in their tenure. In doing so, I provide a major insight into how term limits alter challenger decision-making to run for entry level office while improving our understanding of candidate entry by accounting for multiple potential points of entry.

Author

• Jordon Newton, Washington University in St. Louis