Intra-Elite Competition and Electoral Fraud

• In Event: Elites in Democracies and Autocracies

Abstract

How does the emergence of a new elite party influence electoral fraud? Most intra-elite competition literature focuses on electoral autocratic contexts in which different types of electoral fraud or coercion are prevalent but we lack information regarding to what extent rising intra-elite competition influences electoral fraud. In this paper I explore whether the presence of a regional elite party in early 20th century elections in Catalonia influenced the extent and dynamics of electoral fraud. I do so through a combination of electoral forensic techniques and causal inference methods, such as difference-in-differences, supplemented by qualitative anecdotal evidence in newspapers and memoirs. The results point out that the levels of electoral fraud decreased under the presence of new elites and that this was related to some shifts on the types and intensity of fraud. New regional elites, without direct access to the administrative apparatus had to resort to electoral mobilization resources and to different types of electoral manipulation strategies. All in all, this paper shows that intra-elite competition can also foster democratization through the cleansing of certain electoral procedures.

Author

• Pau Vall-Prat, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - IC3JM