Signalling and Terrorism

• In Event: Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Abstract

Terrorism is often perceived as a strategic tool that signals the capability and resolve of certain groups, given its inherently violent nature, particularly among policymakers and academics. However, existing studies in the literature have yet to explore the circumstances under which signaling proves beneficial for these groups. I developed a signaling model in which an insurgent group chooses a level of attack based on their capacity in the first period. In equilibrium, we observe that credible signals effectively persuade target governments to offer greater concessions to groups demonstrating higher capacity. Moreover, if the target government is sufficiently pessimistic about the outcomes of militarized conflict, it is more likely to make substantial concessions to avert war. This dynamic creates an incentive for weaker groups to bluff strength. Comparative statics show that as the probability of victory in war gets more sensitive to the capacity of insurgent group, there is a higher incentive for the group to bluff strength. I illustrate this mechanism with a case study of the rise of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka during the mid-1980s.

Author

• Isil Idrisoglu, University of Pittsburgh