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How do external actors and organizations that lead global nonproliferation policies impact the trajectory of vertical nuclear proliferation of regional nuclear powers? While international efforts have proved largely successful in preventing the emergence of new nuclear states, they are limited in containing the expansion of existing regional nuclear arsenals like Pakistan and India. Since becoming overt nuclear weapon states in 1998, Pakistan and India have developed a variety of delivery platforms, weapon systems, and capabilities to enhance and maintain their nuclear deterrence. Counter to the projections of the nuclear revolution theory, the 1990s and 2000s witnessed a regional missile arms race, propelling the development of a diverse range of missile delivery systems. This paper aims to study this phenomenon of vertical nuclear proliferation and examine why and how Pakistan has adopted various strategies to diversify its nuclear portfolio, particularly its missile program. It specifically examines the puzzle of how resource-constrained nuclear programs like Pakistan tackle both demand and supply side costs, including technical challenges, international restrictions, and a turbulent security environment to expand their arsenal. This paper analyzes three decades of nuclear decision-making in Pakistan and employs a combination of qualitative methods, including a brief comparative analysis of the Indian nuclear program. It finds that alliance politics, strategic partnerships, and export control clubs can, on the one hand, impose supply-side constraints on the nuclear ambitions of these states, but they can also have an inadvertent effect that fuels their resolve and accelerates the pace of these programs. The inconsistencies and fluctuations in non-proliferation standards can create expectations about narrowing procurement windows and alter a state's threat perception, prompting a faster acquisition pace. States can subsequently respond and aim to circumvent these challenges by seeking external assistance or building domestic self-reliance in nuclear production. Overall, however, the successful operationalization of military innovations, such as ballistic missiles, depends not only on access to foreign technology but also on the robust domestic organizational capacity that can facilitate technology absorption.