Isn’t It Ironic?: How Perceptions of Democratic Backsliding Shape Views of China

• In Event: Voters and Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

Does a world experiencing democratic backsliding pose less of a threat to an authoritarian global power such as China? An underlying assumption driving concerns about authoritarian diffusion is that authoritarianism may be attractive to the public, particularly a disaffected public that is frustrated with democracy. Through a logic of effectiveness or merely appropriateness (Ambrosio 2010), China may entice foreign publics, thereby even facilitating democratic backsliding. Indeed, China is often accused of attempting to “make the world safe for autocracy.” (Weiss 2019) Consequently, we might expect more favorability towards China in countries that experience democratic erosion.

Yet existing data instead demonstrate the opposite. Based on data from the Asianbarometer, Latinobarometro, and Afrobarometer, individuals that have greater satisfaction with democracy express greater positivity towards China across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Meanwhile, individuals who perceive their own countries as experiencing democratic backsliding have more negative opinions about China. What explains this puzzling association between perceived strength of democracy and favorability towards China?

We use survey experiments in a large-scale, population-representative survey in eight countries across South America and Southeast Asia (N=19,200) to unpack this empirical puzzle. Firstly, using original targeted questions, we identify the relationship between an individual's perception of democratic quality in their home country and their preference for cooperation with China. Secondly, we explore the mechanism driving this relationship. Using randomized informational text treatments, we test the following hypotheses. First, if democratic backsliding increases public concern about the checks and balances of their political system or the strength of their country’s institutions, external authoritarian forces such as China may find a less hospitable reception, as the public may be concerned that actors from China may not abide by democratic principles and their home country’s institutions are insufficiently strong to hold Chinese actors accountable. Second, if democratic backsliding raises public concern about corrupt elites undermining their country’s interests, external authoritarian forces such as China may find a less hospitable reception. In this scenario, the public may be concerned that corrupt elites are susceptible to foreign influence. We focus on eight large middle-income democracies (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) to capture populations that are substantively significant and understudied, and that have substantial political and economic ties with China.

This article bridges two emerging literatures, one on democratic backsliding and the other on authoritarian diffusion. We contribute to this literature by adding a discussion of scope conditions of authoritarian diffusion, and the foreign policy outcomes of democratic backsliding. Empirically, we also answer an important question regarding whether China benefits from other countries’ democratic backsliding. Our findings suggest that a growing global presence for China need not be incompatible with democracy. Rather, perhaps ironically, China could benefit from global South countries strengthening their own democratic institutions.

Works cited:
1. Ambrosio T. Constructing a framework of authoritarian diffusion: Concepts, dynamics, and future research. Int Stud Perspect. 2010;11(4):375–92.
2. Weiss JC. A world safe for autocracy?. Foreign Affairs. 2019 Jul 1;98(4):92-108.

Authors

• David Janoff Bulman, Johns Hopkins University

• Ning Leng, Georgetown University

• Kerry Ratigan, Amherst College