Autocratic Succession Rules and the Survival of Autocratic Regimes

• In Event: Digital Authoritarianism, Regime Survival, and Authoritarian Diffusion

Abstract

All political regimes must handle succession, but succession presents greater challenges to autocracies. Autocracies lack inherent features for transferring power between individuals. Non-routine transfers, which in occur sudden, unexpected moments, are particularly perilous. A dictator’s death can trigger a succession crisis that destabilizes the regime and portends its demise. Recent work has examined how one succession rule, designated successors, helps dictators avoid coups. I use original data to evaluate the effects of succession rules on the survival of the regime itself and consider more types of succession rules. I argue that succession rules can help autocracies survive by reducing instability after a dictator’s death. The death of a dictator is a common cause of political instability. The dictator’s death can produce a power vacuum. Without a clear successor or process for replacing the dictator, violence is a likely solution. Even the expectation of a power vacuum can encourage coups. If elites worry that the regime will perish with the dictator, elites can stage preemptive coups to bypass the power vacuum.

Succession rules provide structures for replacing the dictator and avoiding power vacuums. If the constitution designates a successor, the successor functions as a focal point—or obvious solution—around which elites can organize. The successor may take over permanently or rule only on an acting basis. Even a temporary leader helps the regime persist and allows elites to choose a new dictator. Succession rules can still bolster survival without naming a successor. A constitutional process for succession gives elites a publicly known set of procedures for selecting a caretaker and a new permanent leader. The existence of a process facilitates peaceful bargaining between elites without resorting to violence.

I collect original data on constitutional succession rules for all 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence. I code four types of succession rules: permanent designated successors, caretaker designated successors, process-only rules, and no rule. Designated successors are individuals or holders of a specific office named in the constitution to succeed the chief executive after a permanent vacancy. Designated successors have two types. Permanent successors take full power and serve for the entire remaining term. Caretakers rule on an acting basis until a new leader is chosen. A process-only rule exists if the constitution has a succession rule but does not name the immediate successor. If there is neither a designated successor nor a process-only rule, there is no succession rule. For designated successors and process-only rules, I verify that the rule is operational by checking that the designated successor’s position is held or that the body responsible for conducting the process is meeting.

With this data, I test whether the presence of succession rules affects the persistence of autocratic regimes. As expected, regimes with succession rules survive longer. The effect increases with the amount of certainty that the succession rule provides. Permanent designated successors, which identify the next leader over the short- and long-term, have the strongest effect. Caretakers, which only identify the short-term leader, have the second strongest effect. Process-only rules, which identify neither the short- nor long-term leader, have the weakest effect though they still provide benefits over having no rule. To help address the potential endogeneity that regimes more likely to survive are more likely to have succession rules, I also analyze the effects of succession rules after a dictator dies in office. Consistent with my argument, regimes with succession rules persist longer after a dictator's death than regimes without succession rules.

The results demonstrate that the effects of succession rules go beyond individual dictators to dictatorial regimes more broadly. Further, the mechanisms suggest future areas of research. Succession rules can facilitate coordination by providing information and certainty over the future. Succession rules' effects on information could extend beyond regime elites to other domestic actors and international actors like other states and foreign investors. Considering how succession rules provide information for different actors will allow for expanding the range of outcomes that succession rules influence beyond survival.

Author

• Sam Sharman, Texas A&M University