Social Capitol: A Theory of Political Capital in the U.S. Congress

• In Event: Lawmaking Today

Abstract

What does it mean for a legislator to earn political capital? This paper is the theory chapter of a book in development. Observing political capital is challenging because it is a subjective and amorphous concept. I introduce the Emergent Politics Framework, which suggests that political capital is an emergent property of the formal and informal networks among legislators. When legislative politics is viewed through a relational lens, we observe the imprint of political capital in the patterns of connections among lawmakers. The framework suggests that political capital comes in several varieties, including influence, persuasion, trust, resilience, and others. These forms of capital can be observed in the patterns of network connections among legislators. Empirically, I develop measures of political capital from observed networks of campaign finance connections and legislative caucus memberships. In later chapters, I examine those networks over thirty years to evaluate their presence. Later I test expectations about the implications of members with various forms of political capital. For example, members with high political capital will be more likely to become party or committee leaders, more likely to contribute campaign funds to other members, and more often be on the winning side of roll call votes when in the majority. This project is a first step in conceptualizing and measuring this concept and does not overcome all the endogenous challenges of distinguishing earning political capital from spending it; nonetheless, the paper seeks to advance our understanding of this concept in US politics.

Author

• Jennifer Nicoll Victor, George Mason University