Mobilization versus Persuasion in Electoral Campaigns

• In Event: Models of Electoral Competition

Abstract

In recent years, political campaigns have evolved into highly sophisticated endeavors, leveraging extensive databases of personal information to discern the political inclinations of voters. This raises the question of how increased information about individuals' political affiliations and persuadability influences the strategic allocation of campaign resources by political parties engaged in electoral contests. To address this inquiry, we develop a game-theoretic model that delineates the dynamics of electoral competition between two parties, each determining the optimal distribution of resources between mobilizing partisan supporters and persuading undecided voters.

The analysis reveals that when parties can more accurately identify potential supporters among undecided voters, there is a diminished allocation of resources toward persuasion. Furthermore, we show that heightened information about voters' political orientations leads to a reduced allocation of campaign resources to persuasion relative to mobilization. This effect is more pronounced when parties possess larger campaign budgets and the proportion of undecided voters in the electorate is relatively lower. This analytical framework establishes a theoretical basis for advancing our understanding of the substance of campaign communication and targeting strategies in the digital age. Additionally, it generates novel empirical predictions concerning the impact of campaign financing and the electorate's composition on the micro-targeting strategy employed by political parties.

Authors

• Tiberiu C. Dragu, New York University

• Xiaochen Fan, New York University