Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Conference
Location
About APSA
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Opposition parties in Hungary and Turkey successfully gained the control over the local governments of their respective pivotal cities, Budapest and Istanbul. In Hungary and Turkey, the playing field for opposition groups has shrunk mainly due to restrictions on media freedom, the use of law enabling incumbents to use a broader category of manipulation and pressure, and uneven access to state resources. Yet, only a few studies ask how authoritarian populist governments respond to opposition parties in local governments. The most known hurdle for these local governments was budget restrictions and lawsuits. However, we do not have an in-depth analytical analysis of the strategies authoritarian populist governments adopt against them. Another critical question is how voters in these cities react to the governmental policies blocking the policy-making ability of local governments and hence, public service for them. Do the performances of local governments affect their view of these policies? Would successful governance make a difference in the minds of partisans of incumbent parties in Hungary and Turkey's highly polarized political environment? Would their reactions against the policy-blocking strategies of incumbents depend on the policy fields under restriction? This study addresses these questions with a conjoint survey experiment in Turkey. The results have crucial implications for the potential role of local governments in preventing further democratic erosion and breaking highly polarized environments.