Private-Sector Support for Programmatic Candidates: Evidence from Senegal

• In Event: Learning from Global Democratic Challenges and Innovations Mini-Conference III: Democracy in Francophone Africa: Enduring Challenges and Paths Forward

Abstract

Informal firm owners in developing countries are thought to value clientelistic policies. Informal firms vie for targeted goods in competition over limited state resources, and, due to the electoral value of private-sector support, politicians offer clientelistic policies such as forbearance. In some countries where the informal sector has historically dominated economies, however, policymakers have touted business formalization as a method to break away from such clientelistic cycles. In this paper, we examine the conditions under which business owners may vote for programmatic candidates that campaign on impersonal, universalistic policies instead of particularistic ones. We argue that firm formality plays a critical role in moderating support for clientelistic candidates. Formal firms, facing complex local political pressures, are more likely to support programmatic candidates. Informal firms who believe they might formalize similarly break away from the cycle of clientelism. Using evidence from an information experiment conducted with firm owners in the formal and informal sectors ahead of Senegal’s local elections in 2022, we demonstrate the conditions under which workers prefer programmatic candidates. The results have implications for breaking links between the private sector and clientelism in developing economies, and simultaneously reducing economic inequality and market segmentation.

Authors

• Abhit Bhandari, Vanderbilt University

• Jessica Gottlieb, University of Houston