Imposed Social Orders? A Typology of Armed Groups’ Governing Violence

• In Event: Violent Social Control of Civilians by Armed Groups

Abstract

Armed groups’ regulation of civilian populations under their control is a central activity, which allows them to prevent challenges to their rule, enforce their own vision of society, and respond to popular demands for the provision of security. These tasks largely revolve not around combatting an opponent or protecting civilians from external threat, but mediating conflicts between civilians and between civilians and combatants. What forms does this coercive governance by armed groups take? What determines the processes through which armed groups make governance decisions and mete out punishments?

In this paper, we clarify the concept of governing violence through a 2x2 typology. One dimension is how formal the rules for governing violence are. Are they written and well-known, following a clear progression from investigation to punishment? Or are they informal, with civilians not knowing exactly what actions will be punished, and how? The second dimension is whether governing violence is demanded by a majority of the community or imposed. For example, sanctions against thieves are likely to be quite popular, whereas requiring permission from the armed group to leave the area is not. We draw on examples from Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Northern Ireland, and Syria to explain how governing violence varies across time and space within conflicts.

Authors

• Andrés Felipe Aponte, Universidad del Rosario

• Daniel Raoul Hirschel-Burns, Princeton University

• Andres Uribe, Stanford University