A ‘See You Soon’ to Arms: The Politics of Post-war Military Reforms

• In Event: U.S. Military Post-War Analysis

Abstract

In the world of wars and their lessons, it has been commonly declared that the military always “fights the last war.” The reality, however, is that countries learn and reform their militaries very differently after wars. In some cases, civilians participate extensively in military reforms. In others, the military has complete autonomy to reform itself. How to explain this variation? What are the determinants of civilian participation in post-war military reforms? In this article, I analyze the varied level of civilian participation in post-war reforms, which, in turn, affects their nature and direction. Both civilians and military have strong incentives to lead reforms, and therefore, I argue, the key to understanding who leads reforms lies in the balance of political power between civilians and the military. In post-war contexts, this balance of power is largely determined by whom the public assigns responsibility—credit or blame—for war outcomes. I test this theory using an original cross-national dataset on post-war reform that specifies the reforms, marks who leads the reform effort, and identifies whether civilians or the military are blamed for defeat or receive credit for victory. Two case studies—on the U.S. after Vietnam and on Israel after the Yom Kippur War—trace the causes and mechanisms of civilian participation in reforms. My findings robustly support the hypothesis that the attribution of blame or praise is associated with civilian participation in subsequent reforms. These findings have important implications for the literature on military innovation and reforms, military effectiveness, and the domestic consequences of war more broadly, including democracy and civil-military relations.

Author

• Pedro Accorsi Amaral, University of Notre Dame