Understanding Democracy’s Value: Why Pluralism Should Be Preferred to Parsimony

• In Event: Democracy at Risk

Abstract

Should normative arguments about complex institutions be parsimonious or complex? When it comes to theoretical arguments, it is common to believe parsimony is almost always preferable. We argue that when it comes to democracy, we have reasons to prefer complexity. We show why it makes sense to develop complex arguments for democracy, arguments with plural grounds or foundations (though not too many!).


Our argument turns on the virtue of robustness—a robust argument remains credible notwithstanding the introduction of additional considerations. We show why a complex argument is more likely to retain its force when we consider the range of conditions in which democratic regimes exist. A justification of democracy that applies to a very narrow set of circumstances will not elucidate the value of the practice in many or most of the situations. In that sense, a narrow justification will not be, in an important sense, a justification of democracy at all. We also show why complex arguments are more likely to retain their force when we consider countervailing considerations—i.e. reasons not to value democracy. In the course of our analysis, we treat several potential objections to our account—focusing on whether democracy has an essence, on the analytical difficulties raised by complexity, on the possibility that various grounds for democracy might be in conflict and on the possibility that various grounds might not be independent. Finally, we draw out the broader implications of our analysis. While our focus is democracy, there is little reason to doubt that our analysis has implications for other complex institutions as well.

Authors

• Jeff Spinner-Halev, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

• Alexander Kirshner, Duke University