Towards a Deliberative Democratic Critique of Elite Philanthropy

• In Event: Wealth, Markets, and Plutocracy

Abstract

A growing scholarship of elite philanthropy and democracy [henceforth referred to as the EP&D Literature] present strong democratic critiques of elite philanthropy. This literature demonstrates that elite philanthropy has come to represent plutocratic exertions of power. Further, such critiques also discuss how elite philanthropy is a neoliberal phenomenon that emphasizes neoliberal ideology. I argue that this literature draws on a minimalist conception of democratic theory that presumes a standard theory of democracy most commonly associated with Robert Dahl to advance democratic critiques. Scholars note how elite philanthropic donations allow for the wealthy to exert asymmetric political influence over public institutions that dilute the influence that everyday citizens have over them. I argue that this approach captures well the more concrete and measurable problems associated with elite philanthropy. However, this means that preferences are generally taken ex ante, leaving the ideas behind preferences under-explored. This is particularly true because critiques of neoliberalism typically discuss tensions that are ideological and discursive in nature. Because of this, drawing on a minimal standard approach to democracy advances only partial democratic critiques of elite philanthropy. I suggest that an immediate remedy to this would be to include a model of deliberative democratic theory. Despite many strengths, standard approaches to democratic theory like Dahl’s have not emphasized discourse and ideology. Turning to Robert Dahl, I’ll explain what the critiques of elite philanthropy do well at highlighting from a democratic perspective and what they do not. Robert Dahl identifies 5 criteria that a governing body must meet to be considered “democratic.” They are: 1) Effective Participation, 2) Voting Equality, 3) Enlightened Understanding, 4) Control of the Agenda, and 5) Inclusion of All Adults (Dahl, 2015 [1998]; 37, 38). The EP&D literature points out how philanthropy affords the wealthy greater influence over political institutions. This critique illustrates clearly how criteria 1, 2 and 4 are either undermined or violated. When any group or individual has an asymmetric influence over public institutions and goods, we can see how the effectiveness of the participation of everyday citizens is diminished along with a loss of control over setting public agendas. We also see how the normative importance of voting equality becomes undermined when the wealthy can exert such influence. This is because voting is the decisive moment when citizens exert influence over common policies and institutional performance. With respect to criterion 3—enlightened understanding—the major worry is that the democratic concerns of elite philanthropy can persist when the material considerations appear alleviated. One can express this worry using Dahl’s approach; individuals cannot effectively discover their preferences for themselves under conditions free from the asymmetric influence of the wealthy. This includes, as Dahl notes, the freedom to explore one’s own good through self-reflection and discourse (Dahl, 2015 [1998]; 39). Because deliberative democratic theory is concerned with ideas and discourse, and so would be a model of democratic theorizing that would be readily available to critique elite philanthropy from a perspective that includes contending with the role of ideas. Including a deliberative model of democratic theorizing can broaden these democratic critiques of elite philanthropy by offering tools that unpack the ways in which elite philanthropy diminishes democratic norms through ideas and preferences. The standard approach has tools to express this worry, but they are limited. This becomes more obvious when expressed using terms featured in deliberative democratic theory that a conception of the common good is ideologically imposed upon individuals surreptitiously. Everyday citizens, in some sense, have a conclusion about the collective good imposed upon them, surreptitiously through discourse. Using a standard theory of democracy provides a limited approach to discussing how ideas individuals have about their institutions and others.

Author

• Eric Mackey, University of California, Riverside