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Retirements from the U.S. House of Representatives are close to the highest level in the modern Congress. I explore this phenomenon using a mixed-methods approach. First, I conducted eleven in-depth interviews with retired Members of Congress—including several former committee chairs and party leaders—regarding their decisions to leave congressional service. These interviews indicate that the tight competition for majority party status dramatically undercuts legislators’ career satisfaction. Next, I systematically tested these claims using a within-legislator design and an ex ante measure of anticipated majority party status. I find that legislators are more likely to retire as the probability of a majority party shift increases; this association persists even after controlling for a legislator’s individual reelection probability, and is largest for Republican committee leaders who face term limits. In contrast to findings from previous eras, I find that more effective legislators in the contemporary House are more likely to retire compared to their less effective colleagues. This finding has implications for congressional reform efforts by presenting potential structural obstacles to retaining those legislators most crucial to institutional capacity.