Come, Join the Club! Complex Dependence and Entering a Sanction Coalition

• In Event: Economic Instruments and Foreign Policy

Abstract

The effectiveness of economic sanctions is heavily influenced by the composition of the sanctioning coalition. Beyond its symbolic importance, the number of participating countries plays a vital role in achieving the desired policy changes. What determines whether external pressure by a sender or target of sanctions is effective in influencing the decision by third states to join a sanction effort? Existing theoretical and empirical analyses have focused on bilateral perspectives, neglecting the intricate global interdependencies among states. This article makes a novel contribution to the literature by reevaluating key concepts, such as economic and security dependence, through a network-centric lens. This approach allows me to comprehend the multifaceted nature of third countries' reliance on powerful initiators of economic sanctions and their targets. I analyze 154 episodes of multilateral economic sanctions in the period 1945 to 2005, utilizing data from the TIES dataset. The findings have significant implications for policymakers and researchers, shedding light on the influence of complex interdependencies in the international state order on the structure of sanction coalitions.

Author

• Thies Niemeier, University of Konstanz