Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Democracy

• In Event: Knowing and Deciding Responsibly in Democracy

Abstract

Epistemic democrats often argue we have reason to value democracy based on how democratic procedures harness dispersed knowledge in collective decision-making. This paper challenges the viability of such defenses under the conditions of severe social inequality that characterize existing democracies. Historical silences, misperceptions, and stereotypes rooted in the epistemic marginalization of disadvantaged citizens distort the processes of knowledge formation and aggregation on which such defenses are based. Indeed, democratic mechanisms like deliberative assemblies and electoral competition are often at risk of amplifying these distortions in ways that undermine those mechanisms’ nominal benefits. In response, I offer an alternative epistemic defense grounded in egalitarian democracy’s capacity to secure epistemic justice in ideal conditions and identify and alleviate background epistemic injustices in non-ideal ones. The democratic commitment to universal participation in public inquiry on footing as equals, I argue, creates maximal opportunities for the self-reflexive correction of flawed epistemic resources over time, promoting the necessary preconditions of epistemically valuable democratic procedures. Such a view has important upshots for institutional design and highlights the significance of a wider democratic culture for epistemic quality of official decisions.

Author

• Justin Pottle, Loyola University Chicago