Genuine Concern and Voting

• In Event: Knowing and Deciding Responsibly in Democracy

Abstract

In my paper, I will propose that concern for other citizens for their own sake– what I call “genuine concern” – is necessary for acts of political participation such as voting to exhibit maximal value and be as virtuous as conceivably possible under circumstances of normal democratic life. Even though much has been said about other-directed motives and their moral worth, little has been said about how others-oriented intentions affect the worth of political action in particular, and to what extent they render it civilly virtuous. In fact, most presently prominent accounts of citizenship virtue emphasize certain aptitudes that are necessary for what I call “preservatory” ends, but this type of ends cannot grant maximal value on civic actions and, so, they cannot make such acts fully virtuous.

Preservatory ends in politics direct citizens to act for the sake of sustaining democratic norms, for the sake of avoiding instability or national destruction, for the sake of securing tolerant public discourse, and for the sake of enabling fair cooperation, broadly speaking. The contemporary literature on civic virtue emphasizes these areas of theorizing. It is mainly dominated by debates around the so-called liberal and republican virtues. These are citizen dispositions that require participants in public deliberation to engage in a host of civic-friendly behaviors. For example, they require them to adhere to moral and epistemic norms of impartiality in the face of deep pluralism of values. They also require that citizens respect legitimate laws, that they do not free ride on others who contribute to the common good, and that they engage in politics so as to avoid being dominated by an unaccountable State. These aptitudes are fine virtues, clearly, but they can all be consistent with profound indifference to the plight of others whose predicaments may not threaten democratic stability, freedom from tyranny, the civility of democratic dialogue, or the smooth operation of cooperative activities of mutual benefit. To be sure, most conventional work on citizenship virtue today highlights the notion of a citizen who has the right habits to sustain a peaceful common life with others. However, existing accounts of what it means to be a good citizen do not fully embrace reasons motivated by an intrinsic regard for the weal and woe of others qua individuals (even if statistical) separate from abstract notions of “the State” or of “Democracy” understood as systems of collective government and of fair distribution of the burdens of social cooperation.

Some accounts of relational democratic equality go further than an emphasis on preservatory ends by appealing to the notion of “civic friendship” to describe egalitarian relations between citizens. But these approaches hardly explain what type of concern toward others this presupposes in political action more specifically and they fail to explain how the analogy with friendship (which entails sentimental ties to another) holds in the case of fellow citizens to whom we do not relate personally most of the time. My paper will fill these voids by arguing that virtuous, good enough voting– and participation more generally– requires some degree of authentic concern for the situations of others–even if we do not personally know them or do not have a sentimental bond with them. My account, however, will differ from perspectives that center on care ethics to justify democratic participation. I do not deny that there is moral significance in the fundamental elements of relationships (and person-directed interaction) but I do not take these elements to be the motor for acting for others when voting necessarily– and I do not take these elements to be what make for civic virtue, either. Genuine concern can be directed at classes or groups of people we do not have emotional ties to nor can we specifically individualize, as I will explain. It also varies according to how different types of oppression and domination affect us in our position in society.

Author

• Julia Maskivker