Exposing Weaknesses and Perceptions of Accountability: Evidence from China

• In Event: Propaganda, Media Bias, and Public Opinion in China and Russia

Abstract

How do authoritarian regimes deal with negative information revealing its lack of accountability, such as corruption or policy failures? In this study, I argue that instead of avoiding negative information by censorship or attributing responsibility to individual officials, authoritarian regimes may choose to strategically expose their institutional weaknesses to the public. I argue that this strategy more likely improves the regime’s perceived accountability because it more strongly conveys that the government is honest and credibly committed to addressing its weaknesses. Since citizens would normally not expect that the regime is willing to engage in such a level of self-criticism, the counter-intuitive decision to engage in this manner is likely to persuade citizens that the government is honest about its deficiencies and serious about addressing the problems. To demonstrate this strategy, I investigate how the Chinese government actively reveals the regime's institutional deficiencies regarding corruption through TV dramas and documentaries, meanwhile emphasizing how the government works to improve those institutional flaws. I further conduct an original survey experiment to examine the effect of this strategy on public perceptions of accountability. The experiment randomly assigns participants to watch a video clip selected from a state-produced documentary, which either contains disclosure of corrupt officials, disclosure of institutional weaknesses, or none of them. I also included a blank control group for a baseline comparison. This research contributes to the studies of propaganda and its effects, as well as information and accountability in authoritarian regimes.

Author

• Rex Weiye Deng, Washington University in St. Louis