Autocratic Alchemy: The Logic of Elite Purges and Power Consolidation

• In Event: Formal Models of Autocratic Politics

Abstract

The most potent tool an autocrat possesses to eliminate rivals is the act of purging. Successful purges at the elite level ensure the dictator's safety while simultaneously enabling the autocrat to consolidate power and resources. However, a simple command of the autocrat does not guarantee a successful purge. In reality, autocrats require loyal and powerful elites who will comply with their wishes and must be alert to the possibility of defiance. As such, it is crucial to consider the strategic incentives not only of the autocrat but also of the allies designated to support the autocrat's decisions.

The question then arises: how do autocrats obtain the power necessary to purge their rivals? How do autocrats who feel threatened manage to obtain enough elite support to stave off their threats? By incorporating the incentives of an allied elite into the dictator's decision to purge, a dual commitment problem arises: without strong institutional forces, the dictator cannot guarantee that a previous ally will be safe from purges in the future, while the ally cannot guarantee continued loyalty.

Through a formal model, this paper analyzes this core tension. Additionally, the paper uncovers novel insights into the mechanisms behind accomplished elite purges and the conditions that better facilitate purging, most notably the interaction between an autocrat's strength and the likelihood of a successful purge. Surprisingly, the paper finds that it is the weaker dictators who are more adept at implementing purges. Finally, the paper sheds light on why autocrats may seek to strategically vary the intensity of purges and how shifting purge intensity plays a significant role in mitigating the dual commitment problem.

Author

• Seungyup Shin, Columbia University