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We study a model of electoral competition that incorporates two expressive benefits of can- didate position taking: the psychological costs of deviating from one’s own preferred policy and the psychological benefits of antagonizing an out-group. Whereas concerns about cog- nitive dissonance consistently temper candidate extremism, we show, the effects of animus are non-monotonic—exacerbating policy divisions when baseline levels are low, and trigger- ing one candidate’s capitulation (as distinct from both candidates’ moderation) when they are high. We further show that when communication channels are siloed and voters are less con- cerned about voting for someone who represents their own policy views, candidates are es- pecially inclined to stoke inter-group animosities. Our findings have broad implications for understandings of political polarization, partisan sorting and representation, fragmented media markets, and separation of powers.