Stumbling Into War: Friction and the Causes of War

• In Event: Security Dilemma and War

Abstract

To what extent does chance determine the outbreak and outcomes of war? It has been long argued that war would not occur if its outcome were known beforehand. If war then results from ambiguity, can actors in the international system correctly anticipate the sources of uncertainty? This paper will turn to the concept of friction, first pioneered by Clausewitz, and argue that states and their militaries fail to anticipate the exact sources of uncertainty in conflict. This is because friction is more than just a result of battlefield complexity, as it is sometimes treated in military publications and some literature. Friction is the cost of the use of force imposed by material factors. Material forces such as geography and wear-and-tear destroy military capabilities even as those capabilities are being put to use. This inherent and internal degradation of military forces exerts an independent influence on war outcomes, beyond the consequences of either side’s actions in war. The resulting distortion skews states’ perception of chance in the upcoming conflict. States may attempt to account for the complexities of friction but still fail to anticipate the extent to which independent material forces will shape the coming war. This paper will look at ways friction creates attrition and how this produces uncertainty and overextension. To do so, it will evaluate cases when militaries failed and succeeded in anticipating friction and uncertainty. In turn, the paper will argue that friction can inform analysis of the trends and contours of the international system, including military effectiveness, hegemony, and polarity. Friction then has wide application as it can illuminate ways assessments of power and force miss constraints states face in shaping international outcomes.

Author

• Kerby Davis, University of Notre Dame