When the Big Dogs Fight: Small State Foreign Policies in Great Power Competition

• In Event: The US-China Rivalry

Abstract

What explains the foreign policies that smaller states pursue in the face of great power competition? This paper offers a theory linking interest group politics, discursive frames, and the construction of state identity to foreign policy choices. Drawing on evidence from three case studies, it first describes three ideal types of foreign policies: diversification, hedging, and concentration. It then traces the policymaking sequence from structural conditions – both geopolitical and economic – through the domestic political and discursive processes, and finally to the outcome of the foreign policy strategy. This paper makes two key theoretical contributions. First, it intervenes in debates about the role of smaller states in the international system, arguing that their choices about alignment shape the outcomes of hegemonic competition, and that great powers’ actions are not the sole factor. Second, I synthesize elements of competing explanations for state behavior: material interests and ideational factors, arguing that they are individually insufficient to explain foreign policy choices. Rather, their interaction and interpretation of particular structural conditions are necessary to predict foreign policy choices.

Empirically, this theory builds on three case studies of Latin American states navigating US-China competition: Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador. Latin America offers particular theoretical leverage for this research question because of the extensive US intervention in the region, which has affected both domestic and international policies. This direct pressure from great powers makes it a hard case to demonstrate the role of domestic political actors in designing and implementing foreign policies. Furthermore, existing literature on US-China competition has focused on Southeast Asia and Africa, leaving an important empirical gap that my paper fills. These three cases were chosen with a diverse selection strategy to incorporate the full range of variation on the dependent variable: diversifying relations through partnerships with both the US and China (Chile), hedging bets by partnering with one more seriously than the other at different times (Argentina), and concentrating on only partnerships with one (Ecuador, on China). Each case draws on elite interviews with policymakers and interest group leaders, policy documents, party platforms, public opinion surveys, and major newspapers to trace the process of policymaking from conceptualization to implementation and evolving outcomes. Within-case, across time variation is also incorporated to examine the effects of changing domestic political conditions on foreign policy strategies.

I argue that in states where the dominant interest groups are economically-focused, export-oriented coalitions with significant access to policymakers, these policymakers are more likely to consider economic and security issues independently. In doing so, these elites co-construct a positive-sum discourse emphasizing mutual gains and benefits from both great powers. This discourse simultaneously minimizes the security aspects of great power competition and contributes to the emergence of a state identity based on smallness and openness. These states aim to diversify their great power relations between both the rising power and existing hegemon to maintain benefits from each.

Conversely, in states where ideologically driven political factions are the primary interest groups influencing policymakers, they will link economic and security concerns in foreign policy. They are also more likely to increase the salience of foreign policy decisions within the domestic political discourse, expanding it beyond the economic and political elite. This expansion and securitization promotes a zero-sum frame focusing on the perils of great power relations, particularly concerns about sovereignty and dependency. State identity is thus constructed around the idea of being a maverick that concentrates on the rising power and promise of a new world order.

Between these end points of diversification and concentration, states that hedge between each great power have more contested interest group politics, with both economic and ideological groups vying for influence on policymakers. Depending on their exposure, different policymaking actors will either connect or separate economic and security concerns, contributing to a contested discourse that oscillates between positive-sum and zero-sum frames. This instability leads to a disputed state identity and hedging behavior in foreign policy.

In summary, this paper provides both a description of smaller states’ foreign policy strategies for navigating great power competition, and a novel theoretical explanation for their choices. In doing so, I offer an important contribution to one of the most critical academic and policy debates of the 21st century, namely how – and whether – the US, China, and their respective allies can peacefully coexist.

Author

• Zara Albright, Boston University