Future Blowback? African and Chinese Responses to the Wagner Group

• In Event: Foreign Policy Meddling

Abstract

In its competition with the United States, western Europe, and China in Africa, the Russian government has used private military companies (PMCs), most notably the Wagner Group, to support various governments and warring factions during intrastate conflicts, including in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, and Mali. Through the Wagner Group, Russia has enhanced its influence at little cost. It has gained political support, reflected in the consistent abstentions and negative votes on United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Ukraine. Russian companies have gained access to commodities in Africa, including gold and diamond concessions in the Central African Republic (CAR) and oil in Libya. Simultaneously, Russian PMCs fill a niche that African actors—among them the juntas in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and opposition factions in Libya and Sudan—need filled: defense against both internal and external threats.

The Wagner Group has been a success in undermining Western countries’ influence. The governments of the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have all ousted French forces, looking toward Russia for their defense. In response to the July 2023 coup in Niger, the United States suspended security assistance, including training and counterterrorism efforts. In recognition, after the death of much of the Wagner Group’s leadership, Russian government officials visited several African states, reaffirming their commitment and setting the stage for a continuation of PMC activities and, at the end of 2023 began recruiting for a Ministry of Defense-sponsored successor, the African Corps (Африканский корпус).

However, the Wagner Group has not successfully won any of its wars in Africa. While it helped orchestrate the short-lived 2019 peace agreement and since has managed to counter rebel offensives and increase government-controlled territory in the CAR, the war continues, with the number of displaced persons increasing. The Wagner Group has enabled the Libyan rebel forces under Khalifa Haftar to control much of the eastern part of the country but it has not achieved victory; indeed, Russian involvement spurred greater involvement by a competitor, Turkey. In Mali, violence increased after Wagner entered, with rebel group JNIM increasing its offensives and overrunning formerly government-held outposts.

This continuation of violence creates potential risk to Russia’s relations with both African countries and China. Those factions supported by Wagner are likely to tire of paying for intervention that does not yield results. Neighboring countries face continuing refugee flows and the threat of spillover as evidenced by the spread of fighting in Mali to Burkina Faso and Niger. For China, the development of the Belt and Road Initiative and the corresponding building of infrastructure and trade are contingent on political stability. Coups and civil conflicts pose challenges for China’s existing contracts and investment. In the CAR, for example, nine Chinese gold miners were killed. In Mali, many of the schools, clinics, and roads built by China have been destroyed. Additionally, China and Russia are in competition over access to valuable natural resources.

That there has been little opposition to the Wagner Group among those who employ it or China is unsurprising; larger goals predominate. Those factions in conflict seek to survive. China, interested in weakening US hegemony, contracted to selling satellites to the PMC in 2022. Among neighboring states, negative responses exist, but have been limited. In December 2022, the Ghanaian president called Wagner’s presence in Burkina Faso distressing. Chad, responding to US reports that Wagner was trying to orchestrate a coup, increased military operations along the border with the CAR.

Yet, between the inability to achieve stability and the now-undeniable role of Wagner as a tool of the Russian government, there are hints that concern over the PMC is growing. In July 2023, the CAR began talks with the American PMC, Bancroft Global Development. In the fall, CAR government officials met with French representatives about renewing ties. A spokesperson for the CAR presidency said the country was trying to “work to diversify its relations”.

This paper examines the likelihood of African and Chinese opposition rising to the Wagner Group’s activities by studying responses to foreign intervention in other protracted civil conflicts, including Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Factors affecting those responses, including size of the interveners’ presence, level of violence, and preexisting relations are assessed. It argues that, based on current trends and others’ experiences, the use of PMCs is likely to undermine Russian influence in Africa in the long run, opening opportunities for the United States and others. It concludes by offering policy recommendations for the United States.

Author

• Andrea M. Lopez, Susquehanna University