An Aristotelian Framework for Social Cooperation

• In Event: Rhetoric, Emotions, and the Politics of Shame in the Ancient World

Abstract

It is widely agreed that reciprocity is a key condition of a just society. As a norm guiding relations of social cooperation, reciprocity reflects the idea that each member of the community should contribute, to the best of her ability, to the cooperative enterprise from which she benefits, and that the distribution of common goods should in some way reflect these contributions. Nevertheless, reciprocity as a norm of social cooperation remains, in the words of one commentator, an “undertheorized idea.” A number of recent accounts have attempted to rectify this deficit by elucidating the criteria, currencies, and dimensions of reciprocal exchange. Yet such accounts, while valuable, have thus far sidestepped a core difficulty in applying the norm of reciprocity on a political scale—namely, variability in the definition of political goods and disagreement over how to compare and rank citizens’ diverse contributions to those goods.

This paper proposes a framework with which to understand and address this difficulty. Based on a typology of reciprocal forms derived from Aristotle’s ethical and political thought, it proposes to understand political reciprocity as the fair give-and-take, conducted amongst equals, of incommensurable goods across multiple spheres of value. This conception of political reciprocity is distinct from balanced exchange in other domains, in particular the marketplace, friendships between non-equals, and character friendships among those equal in virtue. Aristotle subtly calls attention to these distinctions by using a different verb for each reciprocal form. Close attention to his usage further reveals that each conception reflects a combination of two variables: whether the transaction takes place in a single currency or via the exchange of different, non-commensurate goods; and whether the association rests on equality of status between the participants or formalizes their inequality in some way. The result is a four-part typology that illuminates both the character and the conditions of ongoing fair exchange in four main modes of human interaction.

In deriving this typology and applying it to contemporary questions, the paper takes inspiration from Martha Nussbaum’s analogous treatment of Aristotle’s virtues. Nussbaum argues that Aristotle’s ethics are grounded in universal spheres of human functioning, in which each of the virtues represents excellent action. Identifying this structural feature of Aristotle’s account allows her to distinguish between a “thin,” or universal, definition of each virtue and Aristotle’s own “thick” definition, which conveys culturally specific expectations about what excellent action entails. Following in Nussbaum’s path, I identify four “thin” accounts of reciprocity based on universal features of exchange, which are applicable to every association that exhibits the same defining characteristics. By contrast, the “thick” account for any given community spells out the specific requirements of reciprocity in light of the characteristics and context of that association. The advantage of the Aristotelian framework is thus that it allows for different patterns of fair exchange to reflect the features of a given community without abandoning the universality of the normative standard. In addition, unlike other extant typologies, it illuminates the ethical and institutional preconditions for each type of association by tying expectations of fair exchange to the purpose of the community in question, which in turn determines the nature of the goods exchanged and the status of the participants therein.

The argument of the paper proceeds as follows. After defining the four reciprocal forms and illustrating their basis in Aristotle’s texts, the paper turns to focus on political reciprocity, which is the area in which I believe the typology has the most significant contribution to make to contemporary debates. I designate this type as “complex reciprocity” because it calls for the distribution of contributions and rewards in varied currencies across multiple spheres of value. By explicitly foregrounding the incommensurability of political goods, Aristotle’s account draws our attention to the requirements of a community of equals whose purpose cannot be reduced to a single measure of value. I argue that such reciprocity calls for an active citizenry that not only contributes to public goods, but also publicly claims the value of their contributions and demands the recognition and reward appropriate to political equals. It further requires diverse opportunities for the generation of value to the community, as well as public channels through which those contributions can be claimed, negotiated, and rewarded. In this way, the paper connects the theory of social cooperation to core features of democratic politics, highlighting the mutually reinforcing relationship between participatory institutions and fair cooperation on a polity-wide scale.

Author

• Rachel Friedman, Tel Aviv University