Rethinking Rational Deterrence Theory

• In Event: Nuclear Deterrence

Abstract

Deterrence theory asserts that defenders can alter the probability of war by increasing the cost or risk of aggression. Bargaining theories generally reject such claims, instead treating war as a product of information, indivisibilities or commitment problems. To the degree that bargaining theories are correct about the causes of war, classical deterrence is misspecified. Revising deterrence theory in light of the bargaining approach implies that deterrence is actually a set of objectives, each in tension with others. These objectives are differentially affected by actors' preferences and by attributes of the capabilities used to generate deterrence. I modify a simple formal deterrence model with an endogenous bargaining stage to consider tradeoffs endemic in deterrence. Revising deterrence theory in this manner helps to resolve enduring empirical challenges and operational limitations of the classical approach, even as it offers new theoretical and empirical implications of the basic deterrence framework.

Author

• Erik Gartzke, UCSD