Malfeasance in the World's Least Corrupt Country

• In Event: Poster Session: Political Economy

Abstract

Why do voters sometimes support politicians - and the parties they run for - who engage in various types of wrong-doing and malfeasance. In this paper, we zoom in on voters' willingness to tolerate candidates involved in different kinds of wrong-doing as well as how voters believe political parties should respond when their candidates are (alleged to be) involved in malfeasance. We examine voter responses to variations in wrong-doing from small and seemingly insignificant ones (like having unpaid parking tickets) to more severe forms of corruption like nepotism, violations of campaign finance rules, or receiving outright bribes from firms in connection with public procurement. We marshal evidence from a conjoint experiment – embedded in a nationally representative survey – conducted in Denmark, a country that is often portrayed as the least corrupt country in the World. Our results show that – even in a low-corruption context – voter punishment of politicians involved in malfeasance is strongly contingent on the type of wrong-doing as well as its status in the judicial system. We further examine mechanisms driving voter responses – in particular how candidate cases of malfeasance in political office affect voter emotions and beliefs on politicians’ competence and trustworthiness. Finally, we examine how partisanship moderates voter responses to politicians’ involvement in wrong-doing. Our paper contributes to our understanding of corruption voting in consolidated – and seemingly low-corruption – democracies as well as debates on how and why voters attribute responsibility to politicians and parties involved in various forms of wrong-doing in elected office.

Authors

• Zoltan Fazekas, Copenhagen Business School

• Mogens K. Justesen, Copenhagen Business School